Structural boundary analysis between instruction space and policy space, mapping jailbreak vulnerability surfaces.
Language models process user instructions and system policies through the same input channel — the prompt. The structural problem is that the boundary between instruction space (what the user wants the model to do) and policy space (what the model is constrained not to do) is not architecturally enforced but relies on the model's learned representation. Prompt injection attacks exploit the structural weakness of this boundary, crafting inputs that cause the model to treat policy-violating instructions as legitimate user requests.
This is a structural coupling problem: because instructions and policies share the same input representation, there exist coupling paths between them that attackers can exploit to project policy-violating content into the model's instruction-processing space.
This application addresses LLM security at the prompt processing layer, spanning user-facing applications, system prompts, safety filters, and the model's internal processing of instructions versus constraints. The relevant system boundary includes the prompt construction pipeline, the model's instruction-following mechanism, the policy enforcement layer, and the attack surface between them.
Prompt injection is the dominant security vulnerability in LLM-based applications. Structural mapping of the injection surface provides a systematic foundation for security hardening that goes beyond pattern-matching defenses, enabling architecturally grounded protection of AI applications.
The SORT framework addresses this application through four structural dimensions, each providing a distinct analytical layer.
Prompt injections bypass policy constraints.
Structural boundary between instruction and policy space.
Mapping of jailbreak attack surface.
Prompt design, policy enforcement, security hardening.